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Abstract: 
What is the nature of presidential power? What are its limits, and what recognizable forms does it 
take? These were the questions the late Richard Neustadt attempted to answer in his seminal work 
Presidential Power and the Modern American Presidents​. Neustadt’s prescience and the eloquence he 
brought to discussions of the presidency inform much of the contemporary literature on the subject. 
That said, his book was published at a decidedly different moment in American politics, 
necessitating a reevaluation of many of his core arguments. This paper explores the modern 
presidential-congressional dynamic, focusing on the development of the legislative presidency and 
how presidents attempt to push forward their legislative agenda. Neustadt’s insights will be applied 
to two recent case studies to shed light on the extent to which his model of presidential power is still 
applicable in the modern age. 
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The Presidency and Congress in Context: A History, the Role of Political Science, and 
Richard Neustadt 
 
On the 35th day of the partial government shutdown, President Donald Trump finally 
relented. The weeks preceding the President’s signing of a measure to reopen the government on 
January 25, 2019, were marred by the sort of caustic interbranch conflict that has become 
symptomatic of our current body politic. While the President railed against the newly minted 
Democratic House majority in his efforts to secure funds for his coveted border wall, Speaker 
Nancy Pelosi held firm, jealously guarding the legislative branch’s power of the purse. In the end, 
the President’s hand was forced in part by anxious members of his own party, in addition to a united 
opposition. The partial shutdown had manifested in numerous furloughs for those working at the 
nation’s airports, national parks, FBI and IRS offices, as well as over 1 million federal employees and 
contractors.  President Trump’s approval numbers suffered as the shutdown continued, and it 1
became increasingly clear to Trump’s aides that the White House could no longer afford to keep the 
standoff going.   2
The President cut a disconsolate figure as he stood alone in his Rose Garden address to the 
press the morning of January 25th. The deal struck with Congressional leadership contained no new 
funding for a border wall, but it marked the conclusion of a policy debate that had burgeoned into 
the longest government shutdown in United States’ history.  President Trump had unequivocally 3
1 R​ussell Berman, “The Shutdown Deal Is the Same One Trump Previously Rejected,” ​The Atlantic​, January 25 2019, 
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2019/01/shutdown-over-trump-relents/581323/. 
2 Jill Colvin, Lisa Mascaro & Zeke Miller​, “Longest shutdown over: Trump signs bill to reopen government,” The 
Associated Press, January 25 2019, https://apnews.com/30769167ab7a4ef9adf880d020b775dd. 
3 Jill Colvin, Lisa Mascaro & Zeke Miller​, “Longest shutdown over: Trump signs bill to reopen government,” The 
Associated Press, January 25 2019, https://apnews.com/30769167ab7a4ef9adf880d020b775dd. 
4 
failed in his attempts to direct the nation’s agenda through traditional channels, to convince his 
fellow lawmakers on Capitol Hill that it was in their best interests to address the alleged crisis on the 
Southern border in the manner he favored. Congress remained unmoved, and the final agreement 
was nearly identical to the deal Congressional Republicans initially endorsed—and Trump 
rebuffed—only five weeks earlier.   4
This episode is but a flashpoint in one of the most enduring rivalries in American 
government: that between the presidency and Congress. Their combative relationship is tradition, 
rooted in the theoretical underpinnings of our nation's founding documents. The Constitution 
provides for three separate branches of government, yet intrinsically links their responsibilities in an 
effort to induce conflict and the sharing of authority.  James Madison famously suggested that the 5
combination of powers in any one institution would be “the very definition of tyranny,” and so 
mutual checking and monitoring among the branches of government was encouraged to suppress 
the accumulation of influence.  Take for instance the federal budgeting process. As president, 6
Donald Trump is empowered by expectation and custom to deliver a draft budget to Congress, and 
it is his prerogative whether to sign or veto the appropriations legislation presented to him. The 
power to actually authorize and appropriate the necessary funds for the president’s initiatives 
ultimately lies with Congress.    7
4 R​ussell Berman, “The Shutdown Deal Is the Same One Trump Previously Rejected,” ​The Atlantic​, January 25 2019, 
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2019/01/shutdown-over-trump-relents/581323/. 
5 James Thurber​, “An Introduction to Presidential-Congressional Rivalry,” in ​Rivals for Power​, ed. James Thurber 
(Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield, 2013), 4. 
6 Eric Posner & Adrian Vermeule, ​The Executive Unbound ​(New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), 18. 
7 James Thurber​, “An Introduction to Presidential-Congressional Rivalry,” in ​Rivals for Power​, ed. James Thurber 
(Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield, 2013), 5. 
5 
Little at the Constitutional Convention of 1787 provoked more debate than the shape and 
scope of executive authority vis-à-vis the legislative branch.  How can a government effectively 8
distribute power among independent institutions so as to protect against self-interested behavior, 
while simultaneously providing for energetic, centralized leadership? The president was originally 
tasked with performing only a handful of legislative duties within the separation-of-powers system. 
In authorizing the chief executive to report on the State of the Union, recommend necessary and 
expedient legislation, convene the legislature in extraordinary circumstances, and exercise a qualified 
veto over bills and joint resolutions passed by Congress, the framers sought to create an office that 
would prod and check legislative power rather than usurp it.   9
The structure of presidential authority devised by the Founding Fathers in Article II 
amounted to little more than an imprecise blueprint, intended to be expounded on and codified 
through practice.  Indeed, evidence suggests that James Madison intended ​Congress​ to be first among 10
equals in the legislative-executive relationship, rather than the president. Whereas Article I of the 
Constitution enumerates the purview of the legislative branch in great detail, Article II is 
comparatively brief and indeterminate. This disparity is indicative of prevailing American sentiment 
at the time of ratification; the country was still recuperating from a revolution sparked by 
deep-seated resentment of strong executive power. In the words of then-Virginia Governor 
Edmund Randolph, a lone executive was feared to be “the foetus of monarchy.”  Consequently, the 11
8 Andrew Rudalevige​, “​The Contemporary Presidency: The Decline and Resurgence and Decline (and Resurgence?) of 
Congress: Charting a New Imperial Presidency​,” ​Presidential Studies Quarterly​ 36, no. 3 (September 2006), 507. 
9 Stephen Wayne, ​The Legislative Presidency​ (New York: Harper and Row, 1978), 3. 
10 Andrew Rudalevige​, “​The Contemporary Presidency: The Decline and Resurgence and Decline (and Resurgence?) of 
Congress: Charting a New Imperial Presidency​,” ​Presidential Studies Quarterly​ 36, no. 3 (September 2006), 507. 
11 Andrew Rudalevige​, “​The Contemporary Presidency: The Decline and Resurgence and Decline (and Resurgence?) of 
Congress: Charting a New Imperial Presidency​,” ​Presidential Studies Quarterly​ 36, no. 3 (September 2006), 507. 
6 
framers sought to create a nebulous institution with inherent weaknesses to mitigate the potential for 
tyrannical governance.  
How might Donald Trump have increased the chances of Congress adopting a budget that 
reflected his administration's values and policy goals, given the weaknesses inherent in his office, and 
the perennial conflict between the presidency and the legislative branch? It is by no means an easy 
task. Save for the broad delegations of authority granted to the executive branch in the realm of 
foreign affairs, every president is fundamentally constrained by the Constitutional framework under 
which they operate. The prominence of the office compounds the issues presidents face in 
exercising their influence—as our national spokesperson, the personification of our nation, and the 
closest thing we have to a royal sovereign, the public expects and the president must deliver.  It falls 12
to political scientists to identify the necessary conditions and variables that allow presidents to 
overcome the barriers implicit in our separation of powers system.  
The American Presidency represents one of the most enigmatic subfields of political science, 
in part due to the limitations of quantitative analysis that a study of the presidency entails. Beyond 
the realm of public opinion and strategic use of the veto, institutional theorists studying the 
presidency have a relatively modest sample size from which conclusions may be drawn. There have 
been only 45 presidents, which precludes the sort of longitudinal, quantitative analytical studies that 
typify work on Congress and the federal judiciary. As a consequence, the literature is vague when it 
comes to conceptualizing presidential power and its associated variables.   13
 Not until Richard Neustadt did a scholar effectively articulate the essence of presidential 
power. His research set the paradigm, and now represents the North Star against which all 
12 George Edwards, ​The Public Presidency​ (New York: St. Martins Press, 1979), 192.  
13 Matthew Kerbel​, ​Beyond Persuasion ​(New York: State University of New York Press, 1991), 2. 
7 
subsequent works on the presidency are judged. Neustadt’s insights were shaped through decades of 
experience in and around the White House. As special adviser to Presidents Truman, Kennedy, and 
Johnson, he was well-placed to take stock of the specific practices of different administrations, to 
look lucidly on what bolstered and what reduced presidential influence. From this vantage point, 
Neustadt formulated a well-defined hypothesis. He concluded that presidential power is the power 
to persuade, and a president’s stakes in persuading are conditioned by his vantage point in 
government, his professional reputation, and public prestige.  These ideas constitute the lens 14
through which Neustadt views various historical examples in his book ​Presidential Power​.  
 In many respects, Neustadt was ahead of his time in understanding the chief executive in 
particular and the processes of American government more broadly. He judged that rather than our 
government being based in the separation of powers, ours can be characterized as a system of 
“separated institutions ​sharing​ power.”  With respect to the legislative branch, the formal powers of 15
Congress and the President are so intertwined, neither will accomplish very much, for very long, 
without the acquiescence of the other. ​The essence of a President’s task thus becomes to “convince 
[other government actors] that what the White House wants of them is what they ought to do for 
their sake and on their authority.”  In other words, presidents call on their powers of persuasion to 16
effectuate change, by inducing an alignment of White House policy goals with those of other 
government officials.  
Though Neustadt's work encompassed far more than the interbranch dynamic between 
Congress and the chief executive, his model of presidential power can be best understood in the 
context of the legislative presidency, and how presidents relate to their counterparts on Capitol Hill. 
14 Richard Neustadt, ​Presidential Power and the Modern American Presidents​ (New York: The Free Press, 1990), 150.  
15 Richard Neustadt, ​Presidential Power and the Modern American Presidents​ (New York: The Free Press, 1990), 29.  
16 Richard Neustadt, ​Presidential Power and the Modern American Presidents​ (New York: The Free Press, 1990), 30.  
8 
It is beyond doubt that the president has always had a legislative role, but the advancement of the 
legislative presidency itself is a far more recent development. The term “legislative presidency” here 
refers to the general growth of the chief executive’s capacity to influence public policy, and the 
means by which presidents have inserted themselves into the legislative process in profound and 
lasting ways.  This is no trivial development: American government is purported to be composed of 17
three coequal branches, yet it is beyond dispute that the modern president has emerged as the de 
facto first among equals. Presidential activism has become the norm over the past 90 years, in spite 
of institutions built for the express purpose of protecting against the concentration of power.  
Indeed, much has changed since ​Neustadt’s seminal work was published in 1960. The 
current thrust of American politics and the hyper-partisan tide that has engulfed Washington 
necessitate a reevaluation of many of his core arguments. T​hough Neustadt may very well have 
touched on some immutable truths every president must contend with, the political climate that 
colored his conception of presidential power more than half a century ago was markedly different 
from that under which presidents must currently operate. Were he alive today, Neustadt would likely 
cede this point; he is explicit in characterizing the “mid-century period” in which his reflections took 
place as being marked by the weakening of party ties, an emphasis on personality, the existential and 
unifying threat of the Soviet Union, the changeability of public moods, and ticket splitting.  Only 18
some of these qualities endure.  
The dual concerns of cultivating professional reputation and public prestige certainly seem 
to be non-factors for President Donald Trump, an individual with a known penchant for going his 
own way and employing unorthodox methods. Indeed, in the absence of a cooperative legislature, 
17 Stephen Wayne, ​The Legislative Presidency​ (New York: Harper and Row, 1978), 2. 
18 Richard Neustadt, ​Presidential Power and the Modern American Presidents​ (New York: The Free Press, 1990), 6.  
 
9 
the past couple administrations would appear to have spurned Neustadtian bargaining in favor of 
unilateral action or public appeals. This raises pertinent questions about the nature of the legislative 
presidency in the modern era. Likewise, this paper seeks to answer the following questions: does 
Neustadt’s model of presidential power still hold up today? Do presidents stand any chance of 
accomplishing their legislative aims through the means Neustadt and his contemporaries identified, 
and if not, how can we reconceptualize the true nature of presidential power?  
 
Presidential Power Reconsidered: Methods and the Literature 
 
Limitations in the study of the presidency dictate the structure this paper will follow. As 
previously noted, there is a dearth of quantitative presidential studies, in large part because there 
have been so few presidents. Ultimately, political science is a numbers game, and many scholars have 
tried to mathematize studies of the presidency. The drawback to this approach is that the resulting 
models often depict a world where there are no transaction costs, where the institutions of 
government are monoliths devoid of collective action problems, and where the preferences and 
moves of all players are common knowledge. These quantitative models focus on the strategic 
environment in which the president governs, but not the man himself.  
The qualitative approach is useful in that it fills in these sorts of gaps. The emphasis on 
personality and background tells us a lot about an individual president’s capacity to effectuate 
change, and so our exploration of presidential power will not attempt to quantify what is by nature 
ephemeral. This paper will consider via case study analysis the efforts of Presidents Obama and 
10 
Trump in pushing through the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, and the American 
Health Care Act, respectively. 
These bills were enacted at similar points in each president’s first term, both under 
conditions of unified partisan government. Both pieces of legislation dealt with the same, 
contentious domestic policy issue as well. The case study section of this paper will function primarily 
as a means of applying a contemporary critique to Neustadt’s work. Analyzing the strategies these 
recent presidents employed in forcing the hand of Congress, and what each got for their efforts, will 
go a long way toward elucidating the precise nature of presidential power in the modern age.  
 
Power vs. Powers 
 
In order to narrow the scope of our discussion, the first distinction that must be drawn from 
the relevant literature is the difference between ​power​ and ​powers. ​Pursuant to the paradigm set by 
Neustadt, much of the recent presidential literature’s analytic focus centers on the persuasive, mostly 
personal powers of the presidency—the ability of presidents to bargain with members of Congress 
and solicit compliance from other governmental actors.  ​Power ​in this sense refers to the individual’s 19
influence: what a president can do to get his way within a pluralistic system populated by others 
equally anxious to exercise their own influence.  Conversely, ​powers​ are those designations of 20
authority to the president by the Constitution, federal statute, or custom.  The two are inextricably 21
linked, as a president's ​powers​ prescribe the terms under which they can exercise ​power.  
19 William Howell, ​Power without Persuasion​ (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2003), XIII. 
20 Charles Jones, ​The Presidency in a Separated System ​(Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2005), 24. 
21 Charles Jones, ​The Presidency in a Separated System ​(Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2005), 24. 
11 
Academics from an array of disciplines have attempted to describe the current state of 
presidential influence with regards to Congress, many conflating power with powers. Though legal 
scholars and political scientists may stand apart, the research of each often informs the work of the 
other. Law and politics are hard to separate and lie on a continuum, but the poles are clear enough 
that an understanding of the ​de facto​ and ​de jure​ aspects of presidential power can be neatly drawn up.
 Neustadt initially wrote ​Presidential Power​ in response to what he viewed as a discrepancy between 22
the overwhelming legalistic literature on the subject and his experience working in the White House.
 Most subsequent works on the presidency do not suffer from this discrepancy, in large part 23
because of the clear distinctions identified by Neustadt.  
Presidential involvement in the legislative process is a natural consequence of the chief 
executive’s constitutionally enshrined lawmaking authority. The presidency was granted the capacity 
to stimulate the exercise of Congress’ legislative prerogatives through recommendations, and to 
constrain or even negate it by his veto, but not to assume it by virtue of any inherent or implied 
executive or legislative power.  This interpretation has evolved as recent presidents have taken a 24
more expansive view of Article II to issue Executive Orders, but the fact remains that the president's 
Constitutional lawmaking powers are mostly negative​—designed to counteract but not to preempt 
the actions of the legislature​. Indeed, reliance on formal powers signals weakness according to 
Neustadt and many of his contemporaries. These scholars profess that what distinguishes great 
presidents is not a willingness to exercise their formal powers, but the ability to gather support 
precisely when such powers are lacking.   25
22 ​Eric Posner & Adrian Vermeule, ​The Executive Unbound ​(New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), 4.  
23 Charles Jones, ​The Presidency in a Separated System ​(Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2005), 23. 
24 Stephen Wayne, ​The Legislative Presidency​ (New York: Harper and Row, 1978), 7. 
25 William Howell, ​Power without Persuasion​ (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2003), 9. 
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Neustadt believed that ​powers ​are no guarantee of ​power​; that despite the president’s status in 
government, he cannot secure acquiescence without argument.  Engaging with Congress to push 26
through legislation is an uncertain course of action, because the institution is notoriously unwieldy 
and rife with collective action problems. Yet the prospect of achieving a lasting policy outcome 
provides incentives to which presidents invariably respond. ​Power ​thus defined is not a formal, 
Constitutional position, but rather an informal lobbying role, one that Theodore Roosevelt and 
Woodrow Wilson pioneered, and all presidents since Franklin Roosevelt have implemented.  It can 27
be understood as “influence of an effective sort on the behavior of men actually involved in making 
public policy and carrying it out.”  This paper will consider power through this lens, rather than 28
focusing on the trappings of Constitutional and statutory jurisprudence as it pertains to the chief 
executive.  
 
Bargaining vs. Other Means of Influence 
 
There appears to be a broad consensus amongst those who study the presidency on the base 
reason presidents exercise power in the first place. To the extent a president is “powerful,” he is 
better able to dictate the content of public policy. This form of influence is the end goal of power, 
but the means remain a source of contention. What recognizable shape does presidential power take 
in practice? On this point Neustadt was explicit: the power to persuade is the power to bargain, and 
the president’s status and authority yield bargaining advantages.  The president’s services are in 29
26 Richard Neustadt, ​Presidential Power and the Modern American Presidents​ (New York: The Free Press, 1990), 11.  
27 Matthew Beckmann & Vimal Kumar, “​How presidents push, when presidents win: A model of positive presidential 
power in US lawmaking​,” ​Journal of Theoretical Politics​ 23, no. 1 (2011), 5. 
28 Richard Neustadt, ​Presidential Power and the Modern American Presidents​ (New York: The Free Press, 1990), 150.  
29 Richard Neustadt, ​Presidential Power and the Modern American Presidents​ (New York: The Free Press, 1990), 32.  
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demand all over Washington; with respect to the legislative branch, members of Congress need an 
agenda from outside, a plan with visibility and status to rage against or defend.  A president wishing 30
to succeed should therefore tread carefully, as his choices of what he should say and do, and how 
and when, are his means to enhance his bargaining stakes.  What a president does today shapes 31
assessments of capacity going forward.  
Others concur with Neustadt, though they differ in their appraisals of which factor most 
augments a president’s advantages in bargaining. George Edwards initially pointed to public prestige 
as the greatest source of presidential influence.  Broad public support for the chief executive’s 32
policy initiatives is thought to be the first step in presidential attempts to influence Congressional 
deliberation, because the higher the public's level of approval, the more support the president’s 
programs will receive from members of Congress.  Nevertheless, Edwards’ later reflections make 33
clear that although presidents sometimes are able to maintain public support for themselves and 
their policies, they typically do not succeed in efforts to fundamentally alter public opinion.   34
More contemporary scholars have emphasized the role that partisan division plays in 
presidential bargaining, viewing divided government as either promoting or precluding negotiation 
entirely. As Congress has coalesced into two warring camps over recent decades, the White House 
has responded by supporting its own side more aggressively and by methodically attempting to make 
the opposition look bad.  Which party holds the majority in Congress may very well define the 35
limits of bargaining in the modern age. By becoming vocal cheerleaders for their side at the expense 
30 Richard Neustadt, ​Presidential Power and the Modern American Presidents​ (New York: The Free Press, 1990), 8.  
31 Richard Neustadt, ​Presidential Power and the Modern American Presidents​ (New York: The Free Press, 1990), 150.  
32 George Edwards, ​The Public Presidency​ (New York: St. Martins Press, 1979), 1.  
33 George Edwards, ​The Public Presidency​ (New York: St. Martins Press, 1979), 211. 
34 George Edwards, ​On Deaf Ears​ (New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 2003): 241.  
35 Gary Andres & Patrick Griffin​, “White House-Congressional Relations in a Polarized Age,” in ​Rivals for Power​, ed. 
James Thurber (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield, 2013), 43. 
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of bipartisan cooperation, presidents risk chipping away at the professional reputation that Neustadt 
viewed as imperative for success. Bargaining still takes place, but members of Congress have less of 
an incentive to cross party lines when they doubt a president of the opposition party will operate in 
good faith.  36
Even where powers spill over into power, there is evidence to suggest that bargaining is 
predominant. This may not immediately seem self-evident; in the realm of unilateral executive 
action, presidents are believed to use unilateral power to avoid bargaining so that they do not need 
to wait for Congress to approve their recommendations.  As Neustadt suggested, however, the 37
president's ​powers​ are far from absolute. The capacity of the chief executive to affect the course and 
contours of public policy unilaterally is conditioned on the willingness of Congress and the courts to 
check unilateral measures.  Were a president to issue an executive order that requires funding for 38
instance, the president would need sufficient support in Congress and the courts to ensure that his 
actions are backed by the power of the purse, and favorable interpretations by the judiciary. How 
else can this continued support be secured but through persuasion and bargaining?  
Only one scholar outright rejects bargaining as the means of power. Samuel Kernell wrote 
his treatise ​Going Public​ in an effort to reconcile the unorthodox practices of the Reagan 
administration with the conventional Neustadtian paradigm. As president, Ronald Reagan was 
tremendously successful in forcing the hand of Congress through public appeals. “Going public” 
refers to the strategy whereby presidents promote their policies by reaching beyond the Beltway to 
36 Barbara Sinclair​, “The President and the Congressional Party Leadership in a Hyperpartisan Era,” in ​Rivals for Power​, 
ed. James Thurber (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield, 2013), 115. 
37 ​Brandon Rottinghaus, “​Exercising Unilateral Discretion: Presidential Justifications of Unilateral Powers in a Shared 
Powers System​,” ​American Politics Research​ 47, no. 1 (January 2019), 4. 
38 ​Dino Christenson & Douglas Kriner, “​Political Constraints on Unilateral Executive Action.​” ​Case Western Law Review 
65, no. 4 (Summer 2015), 901. 
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enlist constituent pressure directly.  Neustadt argues that a president’s efforts to cultivate public 39
support is a factor operating mostly in the background as a conditioner, not a determinant of what 
members of Congress will do about the White House’s requests.  Conversely, Kernell suggests that 40
this approach has actually usurped traditional forms of bargaining as Washington has come to look 
less like an environment of institutionalized pluralism​—​one conducive to bargaining—and more like 
individualized pluralism​—​one conducive to going public.   41
Kernell’s assertions are well taken; modern communications technology has assuredly 
brought the details of interbranch politics into the lives of Americans, and expanded the president's 
capacity to reach voters directly. Nevertheless, Kernell’s work overstates the impact that going 
public might have, and mistakes the methods employed by Ronald Reagan as a paradigm shift in the 
nature of presidential power. The Reagan presidency is an anomaly in that he was the first and only 
president to be trained as an actor; the skills he acquired in this profession allowed him to expertly 
exploit the changing mass media environment.  Subsequent media fragmentation and party 42
polarization have fundamentally changed the environment a contemporary president works in. 
Indeed, George Edwards finds that most public appeals fall on deaf ears, as the public is 
overwhelmingly inattentive and prone to seeking out information that conforms to their 
preconceived notions when it comes to political issues.  43
 
Is the Presidency Weak or Strong? 
 
39 Samuel Kernell, ​Going Public​ (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2007), 2. 
40 Richard Neustadt, ​Presidential Power and the Modern American Presidents​ (New York: The Free Press, 1990), 74. 
41 Samuel Kernell, ​Going Public ​(Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2007), XI.  
42 Richard Neustadt, ​Presidential Power and the Modern American Presidents​ (New York: The Free Press, 1990), 273. 
43 Charles Jones, ​The Presidency in a Separated System ​(Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2005), 142. 
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Neustadt’s body of work runs counter to many popular conceptions of the presidency, 
because it places the president closer to the periphery, rather than the center of the lawmaking 
process. In his view, the pursuit of a policy agenda is marked more by compromise than conviction, 
and the chief executive’s eventual success or failure ultimately rests with other governmental actors 
and their willingness to extend a helping hand. In a general sense, and certainly with respect to the 
president's ability to direct public policy, “weak remains the word with which to start” any 
discussion of presidential authority.   44
A multitude of scholars agree with Neustadt’s perspective. The president is certainly 
afforded a special role in American politics and is the focus of the public’s hopes, yet his power to 
make and implement policy is limited by the decentralized nature of government.  The outcome of 45
this incongruity is incessant scrutiny. All​ presidents must operate under the prodigious shadows of 
their predecessors, and their action or inaction will invariably be measured against the initiative 
shown by the likes of Abraham Lincoln and Franklin Roosevelt. ​Presidential leadership is viewed as 
a necessity. But as presidents over the past century have drawn more power to themselves, the level 
of critical observation has risen in tandem.  Accordingly, presidents are granted too much credit 46
when things go well, and are assigned far too much blame when things go poorly.   47
Even so, there exist myriad advantages to the president's position in government that are 
impossible to ignore. The chief executive’s iron grip on the flow of information is but one example. 
The president can choose to withhold information from the public and Congress with near 
44 Richard Neustadt, ​Presidential Power and the Modern American Presidents​ (New York: The Free Press, 1990), XIX.  
45 George Edwards, ​The Public Presidency​ (New York: St. Martins Press, 1979), 207. 
46 ​Eric Posner, “Presidential Leadership & the Separation of Powers​.​” ​Daedalus​ 145, no. 3 (Summer 2016), 42. 
47 Thomas Cronin & Michael Genovese, ​The Paradoxes of the American Presidency​ (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2013), 2.  
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impunity, often under the rubric of “national security.”  The resultant informational asymmetry 48
makes it difficult for members of Congress to challenge official statements about events overseas, 
heightening presidential power in the foreign policy arena.  What is more, individual members of 49
Congress will find it difficult to compete with the president in shaping public opinion. As a single 
entity the president demands attention from the press, and often drowns out opposition voices.  50
The presidency is certainly a position of strength when it comes to attracting media attention and 
directing national discourse.  
Though Congress retains the formal power to make laws, and subjects the executive branch 
to frequent oversight and complex procedure, the abundance of collective action problems often 
makes it difficult for Congress to defend its institutional prerogatives.  To constrain executive 51
overreach requires the establishment and maintenance of large coalitions throughout a legislative 
process that is riddled with transaction costs.  Indeed, Congressional dysfunction can be seen as 52
emboldening recent presidents to take unilateral action to implement their policy goals, rather than 
pursuing them through legislation.   53
 
Is Power Personal or Circumstantial 
 
48 George Edwards, ​The Public Presidency​ (New York: St. Martins Press, 1979), 52. 
49 George Edwards, ​The Public Presidency​ (New York: St. Martins Press, 1979), 53.  
50 George Edwards, ​The Public Presidency​ (New York: St. Martins Press, 1979), 79.  
51 Eric Posner & Adrian Vermeule, ​The Executive Unbound ​(New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), 206.  
52 ​Dino Christenson & Douglas Kriner, “​Political Constraints on Unilateral Executive Action.​” ​Case Western Law Review 
65, no. 4 (Summer 2015), 906. 
53 ​Edward Carmines & Matthew Fowler, “​The Temptation of Executive Authority: How Increased Polarization and the 
Decline in Legislative Capacity Have Contributed to the Expansion of Presidential Power.​” ​Indiana Journal of Global Legal 
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Another principal split in literature on the presidency is whether power is more personal or 
circumstantial in nature. Neustadt firmly believed that who the president is​—his background and his 
sense of power—would serve to impel or hinder efforts at self help. For Neustadt, a president’s 
character represents the key determinant in their effectiveness at influencing the direction of public 
policy, so he stressed that the presidency “is no place for amateurs.”  There are certainly observable 54
differences in the operating styles of different presidents, thought to ​directly contribute to 
presidential popularity in Congress and indirectly to the man's ability to achieve his legislative 
objectives.  This makes perfect sense if we accept power to be contingent on a president’s 55
professional reputation and public prestige. 
More recent literature counters that contextual factors are what determine the fate of a 
president’s agenda on Capitol Hill. From the prevailing political climate in which the president 
operates, to the state of the budget and the preferences of certain pivotal voters, current research 
suggests that a president’s fortunes in dealing with Congress are heavily skewed by context.  56
Presidents with similar leadership qualities can see their power enhanced or diminished depending 
on the environment in which they operate; for instance, Congress and the general public will be 
more unified with a president when facing a foreign threat.  Furthermore, the propensity of modern 57
presidents to exert power by setting public policy on their own and preventing Congress and the 
courts from doing much about it speaks to an aggrandizement of influence regardless of personal 
qualities.  58
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Beyond the resources available to the president, be it experience, geniality, or some other 
source of power as Neustadt defines it, factors such as the state of the economy and the partisan 
makeup of Congress have indelible impacts on what a president can achieve.  To be sure, recent 59
conditions of divided party government and relatively narrow partisan majorities in Congress have 
provided a context within which infighting has strong negative effects on the quality and the number 
of new initiatives that can be enacted.  Bipartisan compromise is the exception rather than the 60
norm. Though it is not the sole determinant, we can expect unified versus divided control to be an 
important factor in a president’s ability to exercise power.  Still, Neustadt and other proponents of 61
the personal presidency make a compelling case that exceptionally skilled men in office can 
overcome the disadvantages of the conditions they face.   62
 
Barack Obama and the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act 
 
The Political Context and the Issues at Hand: 
 
The headlines all but wrote themselves when Barack Obama was elected president on 
November 4, 2008. It was a victory beyond superlative, viewed globally as a seismic shift in the 
greater American political and cultural landscape. For National Public Radio, the headline “Obama 
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Pushes Past Race Barriers, Wins White House” was emblazoned in bold on its website.  The 63
President-elect’s victory was widely seen as validating the struggle of generations of civil rights 
activists who came before, and emphatic declarations such as “Obama Victory Caps Struggles of 
Previous Generations” greeted Americans the morning of November 5, 2008.  At least for that 64
moment in time, print media was once again in vogue, as millions hoped to secure a souvenir from 
this seminal moment.   65
To be sure, a sense of history in the making hung over the 2008 election. The son of a white 
mother from the Midwest and a black father from Kenya had just become the first African 
American to win the presidency in a nation with enduring legacies of racism and prejudice.  Beyond 66
the historic implications, the election of Barack Obama was heralded for other reasons as well. His 
bold vision of a body politic above partisan division, and his enticing refrains of “hope and change” 
drew the support of 53 percent of the electorate, a higher share of the popular vote than any other 
Democratic nominee in history except Andrew Jackson, Franklin Roosevelt, and Lyndon Johnson.  67
Beyond their eight point victory over the Republican challenger John McCain, the Democrats picked 
up 21 seats in the House of Representatives in 2008, bolstering their majority in the chamber to 257 
seats.  The party also gained eight seats in the Senate, later securing a 60 seat supermajority after 68
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Senator Arlen Specter switched partisan allegiances and Al Franken won a protracted campaign in 
Minnesota.   69
Opportunity was at hand. Save for the presidencies of Franklin Roosevelt and Lyndon 
Johnson, circumstances favoring the expansion and implementation of the progressive agenda had 
long evaded Democrats.  The impending period of unified Democratic government​—the first 70
instance since Bill Clinton’s first term—represented a tremendous opportunity to realize pent-up 
demand for policy change. ​Liberal voters and activists expected the President-elect to be swift and 
uncompromising in delivering on the initiatives he had championed on the campaign trail.  71
Members of the establishment had more subdued reactions however, as many recognized Obama 
and the party had benefited tremendously from an unpopular predecessor. George W. Bush left 
office with a meager 22 percent approval rating​—​roughly the level Nixon endured when he resigned 
during the Watergate era​—​and this at a period in his presidency when public sympathy for outgoing 
incumbents often kicks in.  Large majorities vilified Bush the younger for his handling of the 72
economy, foreign policy, and the escalation of the war in Iraq.   73
Although the Democrats recognized the political climate greatly contributed to their success, 
they were also well aware that Obama’s message of “hope and change” genuinely inspired people. 
The incoming President appeared to demonstrate through his resounding victory that the possibility 
of positive and sweeping reform was imminent. Even in the midst of a global financial crisis and 
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fraying relations overseas, Obama sought to remold the social contract within the bounds of what 
was politically possible.  His efforts would be aided in no small part by the high degree of issue 74
homogeneity between himself and Democrats in Congress.  With considerable agreement on a 75
policy agenda broadly defined, the majority party could set about confronting the era’s most 
intractable problems, from addressing the financial crisis to revolutionizing the nation’s healthcare 
system.  
Our first case study will examine the Obama administration’s efforts to bring about 
comprehensive healthcare reform by working with the 111th Congress. The process by which the 
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act became law has been widely described as a marathon. 
Details of the former President’s involvement in guiding the bill through the legislative branch paint 
a somewhat different picture of presidential power than what Neustadt originally described, yet this 
episode is very instructive in delineating the limits of power. Though President Obama was 
ultimately successful, his struggles also lend credence to Neustadt’s interpretation of the office as 
fundamentally weak when it comes to legislating. 
Improving healthcare in the United States has long been a policy priority for Democratic 
administrations, with debate over the best means of reform dating back to the presidency of 
Franklin Roosevelt.  The Obama administration would be remiss to pass up this opportunity at 76
finally realizing the priorities of the Democratic party. After expending political capital in the form 
of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act, the President moved aggressively to turn the 
attention of Congress to transforming the American healthcare system. Obama knew he must tread 
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carefully: the sepector of the Clinton administration’s bungled healthcare reform efforts 15 years 
previously still loomed large. Like the new President, Clinton came into office with bold visions of 
expanding access to insurance.  The eventual failure of the Clinton plan was due to many oversights 77
the Obama administration would take note of, but it was such a traumatizing affair that healthcare 
reform was subsequently viewed as a policy issue to be avoided.  Still, President Obama argued that 78
efforts to expand access to healthcare and lower costs, though ambitious and politically volatile, 
were necessary to address before there could be real economic recovery.   79
 
Charting a Course Through a Polarized Congress: 
 
The United States was quickly spiraling into economic collapse on the eve of President 
Obama’s first term. With an economy shedding jobs at a rate not seen since the Great Depression, 
and investment indices rapidly plummeting, the President assumed office at a moment of heightened 
pressure and uncertainty.  This inheritance from the previous administration​—sardonically referred 80
to by Chief of Staff Rahm Emmanuel as the George W. Bush “gift bag”—​placed the Obama 
presidency in a particularly delicate position, both in terms of the potential for substantive progress 
and the acute  consequences of failure.  New presidents traditionally claim a mandate to implement 81
77 Carrie Budoff Brown​, “Daschle: Anything but Clinton,” ​Politico​, January 8, 2009, 
https://www.politico.com/story/2009/01/daschle-anything-but-clinton-017206.  
78 Carrie Budoff Brown​, “Daschle: Anything but Clinton,” ​Politico​, January 8, 2009, 
https://www.politico.com/story/2009/01/daschle-anything-but-clinton-017206.  
79 George Edwards, “Strategic Assessments: Evaluating Opportunities and Strategies in the Obama Presidency,” in ​The 
Obama Presidency: Appraisals and Prospects​, ed. Colin Campbell, Bert Rockman & Andrew Rudalevige​ ​(Washington D.C.: 
CQ Press, 2012), 42. 
80 Bert Rockman & Andrew Rudalevige, “Introduction: A Counterfactual Presidency,” in ​The Obama Presidency: Appraisals 
and Prospects​, ed. Colin Campbell, Bert Rockman & Andrew Rudalevige (Washington D.C.: CQ Press, 2012), 3. 
81Bert Rockman & Andrew Rudalevige, “Introduction: A Counterfactual Presidency,” in ​The Obama Presidency​: ​Appraisals 
and Prospects​, ed. Colin Campbell, Bert Rockman & Andrew Rudalevige (Washington D.C.: CQ Press, 2012), 4. 
24 
their agendas, and the Obama campaign message of wholesale change had clearly struck a chord 
with the American public. It was in the best interests of the new administration to take advantage of 
these circumstances by rapidly pursuing healthcare reform when the President’s mandate, and 
resultant legislative clout, was at its peak. Conversely, the public’s high expectations and the 
harrowing state of the economy would make the repercussions of defeat all the more intense.   82
The reforms proposed by the Obama campaign would shape the political agenda during the 
President’s first two years in office. It was ultimately Democratic partisanship that would carry the 
day however.  Obama and most Congressional Democrats ran on similar platforms, as to be 83
expected when political parties are somewhat ideologically homogeneous.  Thus, the greater 84
political context encouraged cooperation between the President and the majority party in Congress. 
Drawing lessons from the failures of the Clinton administration, Obama did not submit a 
comprehensive healthcare plan to Congress, instead laying out general principles and trusting 
leadership to fill in the details.  Those close to the President, many of whom were veterans of 85
Capitol Hill, counseled that members who participate directly in crafting legislation have a greater 
stake in and thus will push harder for its success.  Delegating authority to members would empower 86
them to craft a bill that would ostensibly pass, and the President could then step in toward the end 
of the legislative process to shape the final product, while maintaining flexibility in what was sure to 
be a messy affair.  
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If strong partisanship was to lay the groundwork for success, so too would it set the terms of 
debate and define the limits of what could be achieved. Rapid party polarization, with roots in the 
preceding decades, had burgeoned as a consequence of a shrinking Republican conference. Losses in 
the 2006 and 2008 elections meant that the GOP’s ideological center of gravity both coalesced and 
moved even further right.  This gulf between Democrats and Republicans at the outset of the 111th 87
Congress was only exacerbated by differing expectations of what an Obama presidency would mean 
for the United States. Republican and Republican leaning independents were vehement in their 
opposition to the new Chief Executive, many viewing President Obama as an untrustworthy, radical 
leftist with a socialist agenda.  Their consternation heralded the arrival of a new conservative bloc, 88
concerned with all manner of issues from government overreach to federal deficits, with one key 
issue on which they were all in agreement: President Obama and the Democratic Congress had to be 
stopped.  Despite repeated calls for bipartisan cooperation on the campaign trail, Obama and 89
Democratic Congressional leadership knew they could expect little help on healthcare reform from 
Republicans in Congress.  
President Obama and his counterparts on Capitol Hill duly moved ahead with the 
knowledge their initiatives would pass so long as the Democratic caucus remained united. From the 
earliest stages of the healthcare debate, the White House trod carefully, negotiating with those in the 
healthcare industry to craft a plan acceptable to corporate interests.  This was to the new President’s 90
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credit. Obama may have looked down on the ponderous, give-and-take nature of the legislative 
process, but his prior experiences in the Senate gave him insight into how the institutions of 
government function and the ways his team could design a proposal that would withstand scrutiny.  91
In ​Presidential Power​, Richard Neustadt posits that influence in government adheres to those 
with a keen sense of its composition and shape.  Given that choices are the means by which a 92
president guards power as influence, Neustadt professes that the president unacquainted with 
government is less likely to make decisions conducive to retaining prospective power.  Had 93
President Obama railed against the pharmaceutical and insurance industries, as a more impulsive 
president might have done, the resultant mobilized opposition might well have doomed the 
administration’s healthcare plans from the beginning.  As it was, Obama’s Office of Health Care 94
Reform and Congressional leadership worked to construct policies that preempted attack and 
created incentives to win over the support of powerful stakeholders.   95
Meanwhile on Capitol Hill, Speaker Nancy Pelosi took charge of shepherding healthcare 
reform through the House of Representatives. The process was relatively smooth during the early 
stages of debate. In order to increase the chances of a bill passing and to avoid turf battles, Pelosi 
tasked the chairmen of the three committees with jurisdiction to negotiate a single bill.  H.R. 3962 96
would be introduced in all three committees. Together with her leadership team and a number of 
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liaisons from the West Wing, Speaker Pelosi undertook a months long campaign to consult, educate, 
and negotiate with members of the House.   97
The bill hit an early roadblock in the Energy and Commerce Committee, when a 
conservative Democratic contingent​—the so-called “Bluedog Democrats”—​decried the inclusion of 
a public option, and what they believed would be insufficient cost controls.  This flashpoint laid 98
bare an unfortunate reality for Democratic leadership: while their party was by and large 
ideologically homogeneous, it was far from monolithic. The House majority in the 111th Congress 
included 49 members from districts that John McCain won in the 2008 election.  Indeed, the 99
Democrats' gains in Congress may have overstated the country's push toward liberal ideals, as many 
Congressional Democrats still identified as conservative.   100
With no Republican support for the bill, the requests of those in the Democratic Party who 
were willing to voice their opposition were taken very seriously.  The challenge for the White 101
House and Congressional leadership was to produce legislation that corralled these necessary 
holdouts, while also delivering on the promises made to the liberal mainstream of their membership. 
In a pattern that would repeat itself throughout the healthcare debate, party leadership stepped in to 
devise a compromise, and on July 29, 2009, a deal was finally reached.  Contrary to the Neustadtian 102
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ideal of a Chief Executive dynamically leaning on his persuasive power to lobby members of 
Congress, President Obama retained his distance from the Hill during this time, though his aides 
were heavily involved. The position of deference to party leaders may well have enhanced the bill’s 
chances of success, but it limited the ability of the President to referee the ensuing conflict, while 
also opening up the process to greater scrutiny from the press.   103
H.R. 3962 passed the House on November 7, 2009. The final vote was 220 to 215, with 39 
Democrats voting against the bill, 31 of whom represented districts carried by John McCain in 2008.
 One Republican voted for the bill​—Representative Joseph Cao of Louisiana—but​ only after 104
passage was assured. In the end, Speaker Pelosi was forced to pull the robust public option, while 
also allowing a stringent antiabortion amendment to be offered on the floor​—both decisions liberals 
opposed, but both essential to securing the bill’s passage.   105
 
A Marathon in the Senate: 
 
Healthcare reform faced an uncertain future in the Senate, where Democratic leadership 
oversaw a chamber largely devoid of the same institutional prerogatives and procedures designed to 
facilitate majority rule in the House. Majority Leader Harry Reid’s caucus, though 60 members 
strong, could not afford any defections, as Senate rules at the time allowed for any senator to 
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“filibuster” a bill they opposed.  Only by reaching the requisite 60 vote threshold could the 106
Democrats invoke cloture and end debate. Moreover, both Majority Leader Reid and President 
Obama hoped to gain some Republican support for any potential legislation, so as to bolster its 
legitimacy.  Senate Finance Committee Chairman Max Baucus had for months attempted to forge 107
a bipartisan deal, and finally reported a bill out of committee in September of 2009 after numerous 
delays.  
During this time, fine electoral margins would once again enhance the bargaining power of a 
small but critical group of moderate holdouts. President Obama and Democratic leadership would 
thus be required to compromise on a number of provisions unpalatable to the more liberal members 
of Congress.  Senator Joe Lieberman demanded any form of the public option be dropped from 108
the bill, while provisions that would result in more medicaid funds for Louisiana and Nebraska were 
included to sway Senators Mary Landrieu and Ben Nelson, respectively.  The Senate bill also relied 109
on state-based insurance exchanges, rather than a single national exchange, where the self-employed, 
small businesses, and others without insurance could go to purchase plans.  It was assumed any 110
discrepancies with the House version could be reconciled once the Senate passed their bill and 
moved to the conference committee stage.  
The process of forging a single bill from the two chambers was almost derailed in January of 
2010. Republican Scott Brown, running on an anti-healthcare reform and anti-Washington platform, 
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won the Senate seat left vacant by the death of Ted Kennedy in liberal Massachusetts.  The loss 111
deprived the Democrats of their filibuster-proof supermajority in the Senate, and the uncertain 
future of healthcare reform came close to provoking panic among Democratic members in both 
chambers.  Many began to chastise President Obama; the Democrats had lost control of the debate 112
and the media was whipped into a veritable frenzy, with cross-aisle pundits declaring healthcare 
reform on life support.  There was a consensus amongst D.C. insiders that the President had failed 113
to convey a clear and coherent message that would help healthcare reform pass, instead attempting 
to thread the needle between bipartisanship and the principled idealism demanded by the 
progressive core of the Democratic party. 
President Obama moved swiftly to contain the fallout. First, the Obama White House 
attempted to use a public forum to reiterate their case for healthcare reform, organizing a policy 
summit in late February 2010.  Faith in the power of the presidential pulpit was strong amongst 114
those close to the President, but perhaps misguided when viewed in light of Richard Neustadt’s 
teachings. President Obama, though polished and professorial, was ill-equipped to explain the 
complexities of the healthcare system and the proposed reforms to a largely inattentive audience. 
Healthcare policy is such a complex issue in the United States that even the most articulate orator 
would struggle to be persuasive. Furthermore, a president’s standing outside the beltway is little 
more than a jumble of imprecise impressions, held by a fickle public with apathetic tendencies.  115
111 Steven Schier, ​Transforming America: Barack Obama in the White House​ (Lanham, ​Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield, 2011), 
156.  
112 Barbara Sinclair, “Doing Big Things: Obama and the 111th Congress,” in ​The Obama Presidency: Appraisals and Prospects​, 
ed. Colin Campbell, Bert Rockman & Andrew Rudalevige​ ​(Washington D.C.: CQ Press, 2012), 214.  
113 Barbara Sinclair, “Doing Big Things: Obama and the 111th Congress,” in ​The Obama Presidency: Appraisals and Prospects​, 
ed. Colin Campbell, Bert Rockman & Andrew Rudalevige​ ​(Washington D.C.: CQ Press, 2012), 214.  
114 Vincent Frakes, “Partisanship and (Un)compromise: A Study of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act” ​The 
Harvard Journal on Legislation​ 49, no. 1 (2012), 140.  
115 Richard Neustadt, ​Presidential Power and the Modern American Presidents​ (New York: The Free Press, 1990), 73. 
31 
Presidential teaching as a means of expediting the legislative process is thought to be of limited 
effectiveness, in part because it solidifies policy positions, heightens rhetoric, and personalizes issues.
 The Obama PR offensive was useful however in that it placed focus back on the substance of the 116
issues at hand, rather than on Congressional maneuvering, while also providing time and cover for 
Democratic leadership to strategize.   117
Many Democratic members of Congress initially disheartened by the Massachusetts special 
election were encouraged by the administration’s stronger public posture.  An unorthodox path 118
forward, already bruited about, was to be employed in order to secure passage of healthcare reform. 
The House planned to pass the Senate version of the healthcare bill, which would go directly to the 
President's desk and become law. Speaker Pelosi would then pass an additional bill with addendums 
to the Senate proposal, to ensure the most important adjustments demanded by the House were 
adopted. These revisions would only deal with financing and not policy change, and could thus be 
taken up under the budget reconciliation process and pass the Senate with a simple majority vote. 
On March 21 2009, the House passed the Senate bill on a 219 to 212 vote, with 34 Democrats 
joining all Republican members in opposition. Obama signed the bill into the law on March 23, and 
the Senate then passed the reconciliation bill on March 25, by a vote of 56 to 43. The Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act was now the law of the land.  
 
Outcome and Aftermath: 
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After the passage of the initial House bill, President Obama boldly proclaimed that “at a 
time when the pundits said it was no longer possible, we rose above the weight of our politics… we 
proved we are still a people capable of doing big things and tackling our biggest challenges.”  The 119
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, colloquially known henceforth as “Obamacare” was 
certainly big, both in the terms of the bill’s scope and it’s political significance. The legislation 
constitutes the most comprehensive change to health policy since the passage of Medicare in 1965.
 ​Among other provisions, the Affordable Care Act prohibits private insurers from denying 120
coverage due to preexisting conditions, subsidizes insurance premiums, supports medical research, 
and expands eligibility for federal healthcare for low-income individuals through the Medicaid 
program. It also instituted a widely unpopular “individual mandate,” an additional tax on individuals 
able to afford health insurance but unwilling to buy it.  
Barack Obama assumed office intent on transforming American politics. Instead of 
transforming politics however, politics transformed Obama, with political circumstances forcing the 
President to adopt a more overtly partisan approach to healthcare reform.  The debate highlighted 121
a fundamental difference between liberals and their sense that the government has a responsibility to 
protect and provide for its citizens, and conservatives who believed the government should have a 
limited role in regulating the healthcare industry.  There was to be no bipartisan compromise, and 122
the Affordable Care Act was a presidential failure in this sense. Obama was unable to secure any 
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GOP votes for the initiative, unlike Franklin Roosevelt for Social Security and Lyndon Johnson for 
Medicare.   123
The content of the more than 2,700 page bill, as well as the laborious process by which it 
became law, is illustrative of a shift in our political processes from the Neustadtian vision of a 
bargaining president. Neustadt characterized the mid-century period in which he wrote as a moment 
of weakened party ties, where debate was rarely stymied by partisan bickering. In describing the 
contemporary struggle for power between Congress and the chief executive however, polarization is 
the word with which to start. Congressional Republicans were diametrically opposed to the majority 
party’s initiatives from the beginning. Opposition turned to abject hatred, as an anti-big-government 
movement dubbing itself the Tea Party gained traction after the fallout from the healthcare debate.
 Coupled with increased number of ideologically-driven cable news shows and a slow economic 124
recovery, the political right uniformly refused to associate with the new President.  
Debate over the Affordable Care Act signaled a transition to a modern political reality of 
heightened partisan bickering and an unwillingness to compromise.  This so-called affective 125
partisanship sets the terms of bargaining in the modern era. As the modern president can only rely 
on support from his own party, persuasion becomes less about corralling 535 individual members 
and more about enticing those few holdouts to tow the party line. President Obama ostensibly won 
the battle for healthcare reform, not because of his own political dynamism, but because of partisan 
cleavages and the resulting Democratic unity. Speaker Pelosi and Majority Leader Reid willingly 
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made passing the President’s agenda their first priority, because they saw his success as essential to 
their own.  Coupled with an increasingly ideologically homogeneous membership, the majority 126
party had amassed formidable power to enact policy change without input from the minority party. 
Indeed, the necessity to cultivate a favorable professional reputation in the modern day seems 
limited only to members of the president’s own party.  
The character Obama brought to the office certainly had a part to play as well, for better or 
for worse. The President’s operating style, as well as his political predictions and his policy 
preferences were subject to frequent criticism from both sides of the aisle.  His detached 127
involvement in the process, though expedient in terms of allowing Pelosi and Reid to take the lead, 
runs contrary to the Neustadtian vision of a president intimately involved in the details that will help 
or hurt his power stakes. Obama did not enjoy routinely meeting or socializing with lawmakers, and 
this professional reputation in effect precluded the President’s ability to woo those he needed to 
persuade.   128
The Affordable Care Act was to be implemented over the coming years in a decidedly 
incremental fashion. Obama initially counseled patience, but patience is not counted as one of the 
strong points of American politics.  By the eve of the 2010 midterm elections, Democratic 129
prospects were dim. A slow economic recovery and a landmark healthcare initiative with delayed 
benefits earned the Democrats a veritable “shellacking.” The party wound up losing 63 seats in the 
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House of Representatives, as well as a net loss of six seats in the Senate; one must go back to 1938 
for an election when a party suffered losses of this magnitude.”  For all the early achievements of 130
the Obama administration, the midterm results revealed the 111th Congress to be “both historically 
busy and epically unpopular.”  Court challenges to the Affordable Care Act also limited its impact, 131
and continued throughout Obama’s second term and into the Trump presidency.  
 
Donald Trump and the American Health Care Act 
 
The Political Context and the Issues at Hand: 
 
In his February 2017 address to Congress after an unanticipated triumph in the 2016 
election, President Donald Trump called on the legislative branch “to repeal and replace Obamacare 
with reforms that expand choice, increase access, lower costs, and at the same time, provide better 
healthcare.”  His remarks were greeted with thunderous applause, though only from the 132
President’s own party. Republicans were understandably buoyant; after seven years of merciless 
hostility toward President Obama’s marquee legislative achievement, the GOP assumed unified 
control of Washington in 2017 for just the second time in sixty years.  As president, Barack Obama 133
had time and again rebuffed attempts to abrogate his administration’s work on healthcare reform.  134
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Channeling their frustration, conservatives mobilized a loose coalition with ambitions to slash 
government spending and roll back the American welfare state.  Their relentless efforts in 135
fundraising and organizing had pushed GOP candidates to victory. With a Republican now in the 
White House, party leaders were keen to forge a new governing contract. A Trump presidency was 
finally a chance to deliver.  
Donald Trump’s victory in the 2016 election meant that the most important policy changes 
of the Barack Obama presidency were under serious threat. Not only was Trump empowered to 
follow through on his campaign promises, the Republican sweep could reasonably be seen as a 
mandate to reverse course from the previous eight years.  Trump successfully campaigned on vows 136
to undo the actions of the previous administration, and reveled in his role as the antithesis of his 
prudent, restrained, and cerebral predecessor.  Certainly, Trump the candidate made repeated and 137
impassioned pledges to dismantle the Affordable Care Act.  Also on the chopping block was a 138
series of divisive executive actions taken by the Obama administration, as well as a slew of tax and 
regulatory policies designed to emphasize redistribution over efficiency and uninhibited growth.  139
Even so, the repeal and replacement of Obamacare was slated to be the signature accomplishment 
of the Trump administration's first year, with the Republican party keen to take advantage of a 
policy window left tantalizingly ajar.   140
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Our second case study will examine the Trump administration’s efforts to repeal and replace 
the Affordable Care Act through legislation. These actions provide agreeable symmetry with our 
look at the Obama administration’s earlier success in passing the initial law, in terms of the partisan 
makeups of government, the timing, and the policy area in question. Moreover, the failures of the 
Trump administration detailed in this case study can be understood best through a Neustadtian lens.  
The task before Donald Trump seemed deceptively straightforward to the outside observer. 
Democrats constructed a law replete with procedural complexities and obscured benefits, as well as 
an easily targeted “individual mandate” that penalized those who did not purchase insurance.  141
Given the widespread rejection of the ACA’s Medicaid expansion provisions by red states across the 
country, many low income, Medicaid-eligible individuals were forced to turn to the private ACA 
insurance markets, increasing premiums across the board and providing Republicans with plentiful 
ammunition. ​ But Republican’s faced united opposition from Democrats and a consortium of 142
liberal interest groups.  What is more, Republican divisions had been on display as recently as a few 143
weeks before the election, when many GOP leaders deserted Trump in the wake of the Access 
Hollywood tapes.  President Trump took office as a divisive figure, and a slim majority in the 144
Senate, as well as a Republican Conference rife with internal divisions, would ultimately spell doom 
for his administration’s efforts to repeal Obamacare. The President’s failure to cultivate sufficient 
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professional reputation and public prestige may well have precluded the use of his presidential 
power in this instance. 
Uncertainty in the House: 
 
Republicans in the House of Representatives, led by Speaker Paul Ryan, assumed control of 
translating the President’s promises on healthcare reform into concrete legislative achievement. The 
plan they finally presented to the Senate was an amalgamation of disparate proposals advanced by 
the GOP during the preceding administration, a package of reforms that would become the 
American Health Care Act.  The bill eliminated many of the more controversial and visible 145
provisions of Obamacare. It was also a manifesto of conservative views on the welfare state decades 
in the making. Buried in the myriad sections of the AHCA was the elimination of the ACA’s 
unpopular individual mandate, a move widely expected to subvert and ultimately implode the ACA 
insurance exchanges.  Perhaps more significantly, the plan not only halted Obamacare’s Medicaid 146
expansion, but phased out Medicaid's entitlement status for individuals, converting it into a per 
capita allotment or a fixed-dollar block grant to individual states.  The AHCA would also authorize 147
states to opt out of insurance regulations, such as those that constrain policies with pre-existing 
conditions, and slash federal funding for Planned Parenthood.  All told, the Congressional Budget 148
Office estimated that while the law would drastically cut federal spending, it would also result in 24 
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million fewer individuals with insurance coverage within a decade.  The President and 149
Congressional Republicans were poised for a fight, as much of the AHCA was bound to be an 
exceedingly tough sell.  
The initial signs were cause for optimism from Speaker Ryan and the new president. In early 
spring, two prominent committees in the House of Representatives​—​Energy and Commerce and 
Ways and Means​—​approved a draft version of the AHCA on party line votes.  Problems first 150
arose when the bill went to the Budget committee and three members of the House Freedom 
Caucus voted against leadership, scuttling the bill on a narrow 19 to 17 margin.  However drastic 151
the proposed changes to existing healthcare policy, they did not satisfy conservative organizations 
like Americans for Prosperity and the Heritage Foundation, who argued that the AHCA was 
“Obamacare Lite.”  At the other end of the Republican Conference, moderates opposed the 152
AHCA’s cuts to Medicaid expansion, particularly after the CBO’s prognosis on the number of 
potential new uninsured individuals should the bill become law.   153
President Trump adopted a largely hands-off approach as Speaker Ryan and other House 
leaders struggled to fashion a bill that would be acceptable to both moderates and conservatives 
during this phase in the healthcare debate. That his stance was markedly similar to the one adopted 
by President Obama during the passage of the Affordable Care Act should come as little surprise. In 
an age where party polarization defines the limits of interbranch relations, leaders from a president’s 
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own party will be inclined to cooperate with the White House so long as the electoral and policy 
goals of members align with those of the president.  Most Republicans were vehement in their 154
desire for an alternative to Obamacare, just as Democrats in 2009 were keen to reform the status 
quo. Trump was wise to cede control to House leadership, just as Obama had done during the 
crafting of his healthcare bill years earlier.  
Trump initially acted mostly as “cheerleader-in-chief,” rather than a hands-on negotiator: he 
publicly praised the AHCA as a “great bill,” fielded the concerns of individual legislators, and urged 
them to come together in private meetings. In true Neustadtian fashion, Trump utilized the full 
panoply of advantages inherent in the presidency, including hosting private lunches and dinner at 
the White House, sharing rides on Air Force One, and even scheduling a bowling event for 
lawmakers.  Neustadt was clear enough that a president looking to persuade may be far more 155
effective than his logic or charm could make him by leaning on the status and authority of his office.
 That said, President Trump found it exceedingly difficult to garner sufficient professional 156
reputation when he had already cultivated the impression that he was not a negotiator operating in 
good faith. The best form of self-help, Neustadt argued, is to think of power prospectively and 
jealously guard one’s prospective power through matters of choice.  Though D.C. insiders cannot 157
afford to ground their expectations of how the president will act with erroneous slippages, these 
accumulate, and a president’s influence can wane with repeated displays of incapacity.  158
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President Trump vacillated wildly on what exactly he expected of Republicans in Congress, 
at times endorsing the House bill and hedging his support when a solution seemed out of reach.  159
Frustrated by the defections from both the conservative and moderate wings of his party, the White 
House pushed for a vote of the full House, hoping the prospect of legislative defeat would force the 
hands of the Republicans who were still withholding support.  On the day of the vote, Speaker 160
Ryan pulled the legislation when it became clear it would not pass. Trump initially responded by 
blaming Democrats, but in what would prove to be a pattern throughout the healthcare debate, he 
later shifted blame to Republicans by tweeting that his followers should watch a Jeanine Pirro 
segment on Fox News in which she demanded Paul Ryan’s resignation as Speaker.   161
This underhanded treatment of the man charged with delivering healthcare reform 
legislation in the House was no anomaly. President Trump regularly admonished members of his 
own cabinet, including then Attorney General Jefferson Sessions, an early and staunch supporter of 
the Trump agenda.  Republicans in Congress would likely have observed these episodes wondering 162
why they should risk covering the President’s back when he could not be counted on to take care of 
his own. With his general reputation shaped by an observable pattern of indecisiveness and reneging, 
Trump had established himself as a backstabber.   
Roughly a month after the failed vote in the House of Representatives, negotiations among 
Congressional leadership, members of the Freedom Caucus, and the Tuesday Group finally brought 
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about the passage of the AHCA in the House.  In its final form, the legislation squeaked through 163
by a margin of two votes, with every Democrat and 20 Republicans dissenting.  Trump was 164
nonetheless pleased, and summoned members of the majority party to the White House for a photo 
opportunity. He praised the work of Speaker Ryan, and exalted the AHCA as “a great plan,” adding, 
“I actually think it will get even better [as this process] has brought the Republican party together.”
 His optimism was short lived. The House process revealed a Republican Conference divided on 165
how to go about repealing and replacing the Affordable Care Act, and despite a 47-vote majority in 
that chamber, House GOP leadership had struggled to pass the bill. Given members’ wariness of 
Trump’s character and involvement, the AHCA faced an uncertain future in the Senate,. with its 
two-vote Republican majority.  
 
Troubles in the Senate: 
 
Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell was initially hesitant to introduce draft legislation, 
for fear of members of his own party publicly criticizing the plan.  The House Freedom Caucus 166
had extracted key concessions, such as the provision that allowed states to opt out of consumer 
protections under the ACA.  Senator McConnell was wary of modifying the House bill in a way 167
that would attract the support of moderates, as there was no guarantee an amended bill would pass 
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the House a second time.  Conservatives, including Rand Paul, Mike Lee, Ron Johnson, and Ted 168
Cruz, sought amendments to further weaken provisions of the Affordable Care Act, while 
moderates such as Susan Collins opposed efforts to defund Planned Parenthood.  A president 169
hoping to successfully navigate this perilous track through America’s upper chamber would have 
been wise to heed Neustadt’s lessons on reputation as a source of presidential power. Instead, 
President Trump doubled down on his choice to diminish his reputation through indecision and 
unreliability he adopted during debate in the House of Representatives.  
Donald Trump appeared largely to recuse himself from substantive debate in the Senate.  170
Matters of detail were left to party leaders to hash out in relative privacy, while the President 
alternatively promoted Republican efforts and warned about the consequences of failure at regular 
intervals. These actions often proved to be counterproductive. Even after praising Republican 
members of the House for their vote on the AHCA, Trump later described their legislation as 
“mean” when it became clear many of the more contentious provisions would not play well in the 
Senate.  He declined to provide much guidance to Republicans during this time on what he would 171
sign, with the overriding objective seeming to be legislative victory at all costs.  This ambiguity did 172
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little to inspire loyalty and compliance on the part of Republican holdouts, as they could not be sure 
the President would support them should things go awry.  173
The members of Congress who a president persuades must be convinced that the chief 
executive has the skill and will to call on his available wells of power; their judgement in this respect 
determines the president’s capacity for influence.  That Trump waited for the Senate to act, rather 174
than working with individual Republican Senators to develop a solution during this time, left the 
Senate with no clear direction.  Being president is not like being CEO: the pluralistic nature of 175
American government means that Congress does not work for the president and cannot be ordered 
to act on his behalf.  As Neustadt observed, a president has considerable access to power that is 176
bolstered by reputation, but President Trump’s enduring reputation as an unreliable negotiator and a 
man prone to petty insults and reneging severely constrained his ability to influence Republican 
holdouts. On the campaign trail, Trump had volleyed insults at Senator John McCain, ridiculing the 
Senator’s military service and insinuating that McCain could not be considered a proper war hero.  177
Senator Lisa Murkowski of Alaska also bore the President’s ire, receiving a call from the President’s 
interior secretary, Ryan Zinke, warning of repercussions for the Senator’s home state after her initial 
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vote against proceeding with the healthcare debate.  The experiences of many previous presidents 178
demonstrated that senators are unlikely to respond well to strong arm tactics.  It should come as 179
no surprise that the president’s choices lost him the votes of these senators, votes that led to the 
defeat of the bill.  
Though Neustadt de-emphasizes the role that public prestige plays in persuasion, it is 
important to note many of the key public opinion trends that colored debate over the AHCA. 
President Trump entered office as one of the more polarizing presidents in recent memory; 
Democrats and many left-leaning voters were universally appalled by the President’s character and 
policy objectives during the 2016 campaign, with his early conduct in office doing little to change 
their appraisals.  This relatively low standing with the public served to blunt the President’s 180
influence in Congress as Democrats had every reason to oppose him. 
In looking at Trump’s failures through a Neustadian lens, it is also compelling to look at the 
healthcare debate’s impact on public assessments of the Affordable Care Act. The passage of the 
AHCA in the House riled nearly every major organization with a stake in healthcare, from the 
American Medical Association to the AARP.  The Republican bill polled terribly—whether viewed 181
in isolation or in comparison with the ACA. In a survey taken on the eve of the House vote, just 17 
percent of Americans said they supported the reforms proposed by House Republicans.  Public 182
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attitudes toward the ACA had markedly improved by the time debate shifted to the Senate; a Kaiser 
Family Foundation found the ACA breaking 50 percent favorability for the first time since its 
adoption in 2010.  With the status quo under threat, Republican efforts to dismantle the 183
Affordable Care Act accomplished what President Obama could not in his time in office: sell the 
ACA to the American public. 
 
The Outcome and the Aftermath: 
 
On July 28, 2017, a pensive John McCain approached Majority Leader McConnell in the well 
of the Senate. ​After a number of failed partial repeals,​ Senate leadership had put forward their own 
version of the AHCA​ for a final vote. ​Senator McConnell employed the budget reconciliation 
process to ensure that only a simple majority was needed to pass the legislation.  Senator McCain’s 184
vote was so crucial to Republican efforts, he had flown in from his home state after being diagnosed 
with terminal brain cancer. The bill would fail if McCain were to vote no.  
In one of the more dramatic moments in recent Senate history, and with the eyes of a nation 
upon him, McCain turned down his thumb, eliciting audible gasps and a smattering of applause 
from the chamber. McCain’s vote effectively ended the Republicans’ best chance to repeal the 
Affordable Care Act.  Two other Republicans​—Senators Murkowski and Collins—​joined McCain, 185
as well as all 46 Senate Democrats and two independents in rejecting Republican efforts. For four 
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election cycles, the GOP had railed against the Obama administration’s signature legislative 
achievement. They controlled both houses of Congress and the White House, yet failed in their 
attempt to repeal the ACA. The recriminations would be immediate and severe. The defeat was a 
cutting blow to President Donald Trump and Republican leadership in Congress, as the party had 
framed repealing and replacing Obamacare as a test of their ability to implement the Republican 
agenda.    186
How might Donald Trump have increased his chances of legislative success in this instance? 
Not insulting his fellow party members would have been a good start. Richard Neustadt would 
suggest that Trump’s failures are due in large part to the poor professional reputation he cultivated 
on Capitol Hill. Indeed, members of his own party have argued that the intermittent strong-arm 
tactics employed by the administration made it more difficult to secure a winning coalition for repeal 
and replace.  John McCain was certainly disinclined to fall in line behind Trump’s initiatives after 187
being on the receiving end of the President’s vitriol. Though the President regularly invoked loyalty 
during the healthcare debate, it was rarely reciprocated. He repeatedly demonstrated that his 
understanding of the term implied unconditional backing and not that he’d do his part in bargaining.
 Trump reportedly called Majority Leader McConnell to berate him for “bungling” the healthcare 188
vote, in addition to issuing a steady drumbeat of public condemnations for Republicans in Congress 
after the failed vote.   189
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Trump would also have been better served focusing his initial attention on legislation that 
would have attracted more Democratic support. For instance, a major investment in infrastructure 
projects​—​favored by more than 80 percent of voters​—would have been far less divisive than 
repealing the ACA.  Such an agenda would have forced Democrats to engage with a president their 190
constituents detested, if they actually sought to accomplish something during their time in the 
minority. From the perspective of Neustadt, pursuing infrastructure would have been wise in that it 
would have enhanced the President’s prospective power. Impressions of a new President are formed 
early and last a long time, meaning a willingness to reach across the aisle and pursue bipartisan 
compromise might have improved Trump’s professional reputation and his standing with the public. 
A bipartisan approach in true Neustadtian fashion would have faced its own difficulties, however. 
Our current climate of intense partisanship means that presidents are encouraged to take positions 
that bolster their own party, while becoming “critic in chief” of the opposition.  Displaying a 191
willingness to work with Democrats might well have alienated Trump within his own party. 
Subsequent action on healthcare by the current administration has taken two principal 
forms. The first and most enduring was the elimination of the individual mandate in Congressional 
Republican’s subsequent work on the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017. This is no trivial development, 
as the ACA was largely dependent on the individual mandate to arrest rising premium costs. The 
Trump administration also has sought to undermine the law through a series of administrative 
actions. These include shortening the ACA enrollment period, reducing the availability of trained 
staffers at call-in centers to assist enrollees, discouraging insurance company participation by 
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increasing the uncertainty over the future availability of subsidies, and even using Obamacare budget 
funds dedicated to expanding healthcare to launch a public relations campaign against the law.   192
The healthcare industry is one of the most heavily regulated in the United States, and 
existing statute contains many discretionary provisions allowing federal departments and agencies to 
undermine or support the Affordable Care Act as they see fit.  Donald Trump’s uncompromising 193
search for loyalty is useful in this respect, because his charges in the executive branch will have an 
easier time reshuffling the federal bureaucracy than the President did in grappling with Congress. It 
could indeed be argued that this unilateral approach may yet end up being more successful in 
weakening the ACA than the legislative route.  That said, unilateral executive actions are temporary 194
measures that have no sticking power beyond the tenure of the president who issues them. It is 
telling that Richard Neustadt suggests the unilateral powers of the presidency are fundamentally 
limited, costly, and above all an indication of failure rather than mastery.   195
 
Conclusion 
In life, the affable, chain-smoking Richard Neustadt revolutionized study of the presidency 
through the use of applied theory.  His work was an attempt to reconcile the conjectural with the 196
practical, to bridge the gap between the detached work of his predecessors and his first-hand 
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experiences in the White House. Neustadt perceived an institution ill-equipped to respond to 
demand for presidential action in the ways it would like; despite the president’s rarified position in 
the American political system, weakness was the underlying theme of ​Presidential Power​.  Especially 197
when grappling with an adversarial Congress, the president wishing to make his influence felt must 
recognize his position as both independent and at the same time intertwined with disparate sources 
of power in a pluralistic system. Our constitutional republic is composed of separate institutions 
sharing power: to share is to limit, and this is the heart of Neustadt’s conception of presidential 
power.   198
Nearly every subsequent work of scholarship on the presidency pays homage to Neustadt’s 
seminal view of presidential power as influence or persuasion in this separated system.  Yet there 199
remains debate over the direction of presidential studies, rooted in criticism of Neustadt’s work. 
Detractors bemoan the subfield's dominant methodology: the focus on individual presidents, the 
reliance on thick description rather than systematic data analysis, and the general failure to craft 
testable hypotheses.  All are valid criticisms, broadly seen to have precluded the elevation of 200
presidential studies to the forefront of political science research. Yet the efforts of scholars to 
grapple with Neustadt’s teachings have still inspired some of the subfield's most enduring 
discoveries.  Above all else, the presidency is understood to be a position rife with paradox. The 201
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president is at once expected to provide decisive leadership to solve the nation’s problems, while at 
the same time fundamentally constrained by the constitutional system in which he operates.   202
The distinct political climate that influenced Neustadt’s understanding of the nature of 
presidential power also calls into question his theory’s applicability in the modern age. The 
environments faced by Presidents Obama and Trump are certainly different from those of Truman 
and Eisenhower. To test the longevity of Neustadt’s arguments, we took a thorough look at our two 
most recent presidents and their attempts to persuade Congress to join them in their favored 
legislation regarding healthcare reform, one of the most controversial policy issues of recent 
decades. 
How applicable are Neustadt’s insights to the modern presidential-Congressional dynamic? 
Given the deficiencies that arise when applying the lessons of a dated piece of scholarly literature to 
a changing political context, is presidential power still the power to persuade?  
The experiences of President’s Obama and Trump suggest the answer is yes, with some 
caveats. At the most rudimentary level, the framework Neustadt identifies is still in place. These case 
studies depicted presidents operating as strategic power optimizers in an environment colored by the 
give-and-take nature of every interaction. As Neustadt suggested, the president cannot expect action 
without argument.  Both Presidents Obama and Trump were driven to deliver a lasting legacy by 203
developing an impactful domestic policy agenda that could only be implemented by working with 
Congress. Both Presidents also found themselves without many tools to accomplish their aims 
except for maximizing professional reputation and public prestige.  
202 Thomas Cronin & Michael Genovese, ​The Paradoxes of the American Presidency​ (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2013), 4.  
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This is where the nature of presidential power differs somewhat from the traditional 
Neustadtian conception. The rapid advancement of party polarization precludes a cooperative 
Presidential-Congressional relationship in all but the most extraordinary circumstances. P​olicy 
differences between Democrats and Republicans in Washington have increased over the past several 
decades to a degree unfathomable to Richard Neustadt.  The concerted movement of both parties 204
to the ideological extremes has fostered Congressional dysfunction, familiar to the modern audience 
but not to the mid-century modern period analyzed by Neustadt. Conservative Democrats and 
liberal Republicans who once occupied key leadership positions in the House and Senate have 
almost disappeared, and there are far fewer moderates in both parties.  As a result, partisan 205
compromise is the exception rather than the norm, and ​d​ivided party control is more likely to result 
in gridlock on major domestic issues.  Comprehensive healthcare reform became the top domestic 206
priority for Presidents Obama and Trump largely because they enjoyed unified party government; 
had the opposition party controlled even one chamber in Congress, healthcare might have taken a 
back seat to more easily achievable policy goals.  
Political circumstance can be understood to impede or enhance a president’s persuasive 
capacity. Having control of a unified government changes the calculation. Because members of the 
opposition party cannot be relied on to aid the president, a chief executive looking to succeed under 
this condition need only reach out to likeminded Congressional leadership and holdouts in his own 
party. Literature on the subject suggests that ​the more uniform the preferences of the majority party, 
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and the more distinct they are from the policy views of the minority, the more they should have an 
observable influence on party leadership. When the majority party coheres around a certain policy, 
its members are more willing to delegate agenda-setting authority and other powers and resources to 
their party leaders.  Thus, Presidents Obama and Trump were able to reach out to majority party 207
leadership, as these individuals accurately spoke for their respective caucuses and could guide the 
President's policy goals to fruition. There was little need to cultivate relationships with individual 
members.  
The broader political circumstance​—favorable majorities in Congress and strong 
partisanship—would ultimately play a critical role in the cases of Obama and Trump.  
Many of the finer points of Neustadt’s ​Presidential Power ​were borne out as well. ​President Obama 
was certainly aided in his efforts to pass the Affordable Care Act by his prior experiences in 
government, however brief they may have been. Neustadt posits that a president’s professional 
reputation and public prestige turn on what his constituents think they want and what they think 
they will receive from the chief executive.  Presidents protect their stakes of influence by the 208
choices they make, and the president with a sense of where power comes from is better positioned 
to make choices that lead to further influence. As president, Barack Obama was quick to surround 
himself with counsel that would allow him to consider problems from the perspective of his 
counterparts on Capitol Hill. Consequently, the choices he made in pursuing healthcare reform were 
more conducive to further influence. He recognized that reluctant members of Congress would 
consider his reputation and public prestige when making decisions, and so Obama made choices to 
maximize good will. To ask how a president can guard his persuasive capacity in choices he makes is 
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to inquire how clearly he perceives, and Obama perceived that Congress would be more responsive 
to his demands if he allowed leadership to take the reigns. He also enhanced his reputation by 
bringing the healthcare industry into the fold, involving them in debate so as to construct legislation 
acceptable to corporate interests.  
While President Obama adhered to Neustadt’s advice to good effect, President Trump 
spurned the same advice and suffered for it. Trump’s penchant for attacking those from whom he 
demanded loyalty earned him a professional reputation that would doom his efforts to sway the few 
holdouts he needed to persuade. Whereas Obama was an accommodating and reliable ally to the 
leadership team tasked with delivering on his initiatives, Trump was stubborn and capricious. Both 
presidents took a back seat in allowing majority party leadership to craft proposals that would pass, 
but Trump frequently wavered in his support of his counterparts on the Hill. Coupled with his 
attacks on Senator John McCain, the vote that would sink the American Health Care Act in the 
Senate, it is easy to see how Trump’s inexperience and acts of choice hurt his persuasive capacity. In 
order to emulate the success of his predecessor, President Trump would have done well to foster a 
more positive professional reputation.  
Richard Neustadt’s work is not the final word on the nature of presidential power. It is best 
understood as a proto-theory to be tested and refined, a framework for understanding the qualia of a 
president’s influence in government.  Subsequent political development will invariably change the 209
ways in which the president and Congress interact, but the experiences of the Obama and Trump 
administrations affirm the lasting validity of Neustadt’s arguments.  
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The grandiosity of the presidential stage certainly invites the chief executive to seek political 
power and authority so as to wield it over the other institutions of government.  Expectation that a 210
president insert himself in the legislative process provides the sort of presidential energy Alexander 
Hamilton so eloquently termed the “leading character in the definition of good government.”  Yet 211
for all the benefits of a president acting in the dynamic, entrepreneurial fashion encouraged by 
Neustadt, his approach does not distinguish between the use and abuse of presidential power.  212
Looking at specific instances of presidents leaning on their persuasive capabilities is to lose sight of 
the forest for the trees: modern presidents have steadily drawn power to themselves by virtue of 
their enhanced visibility and through the use of unilateral executive action, regardless of the presence 
or absence of Neustadtian characteristics conducive to presidential influence. Congress has 
delegated extensive authority to the executive both explicitly through statute and implicitly by way of 
inaction. For most new initiatives, the president leads and Congress follows.  The modern 213
legislative presidency, though weak in some aspects, is augmented by a Congress unwilling and 
unable to reclaim the authority vested in them by the Constitution. The growth of partisan rancor 
and the deference granted to a president of one’s own party means that the interests of the men and 
women in Congress are no longer connected with the constitutional rights of the place.   214
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